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In Chapter 1, Rollin deals with "the first version"
of "the Frankenstein thing," the contention that genetic
engineering is intrinsically wrong. "There are certain
things humans were not meant to do" (vii), and genetic
engineering is one of them. His targets here are the
media, scientific ideology, Jeremy Rifkin, Holmes
Rolston, and anthropocentric theology. In its drive to
sell its product, the media is driven to package all issues
in "small, provocative bits" that "can be dramatically
presented as black-and-white extremes" (7). Such
successful packaging supplants careful analyses of the
ethical dimensions of social policy issues.
This is especially the case when those who are most
familiar with the issue-because they are participants
in it--<:ontend that what they are doing is "value-free."
Scientists are fond of making this claim, so they can
busily go about doing science without having to bother
with thinking about the morality of what they are
doing. Rollin delivers the swift kick in the rear that
this head-down, ass-up ostrich pose invites and
deserves. Rollin argues that such scientists confuse the
fact that the truth of scientific statements does not
depend on moral values with the fantasy that the
enterprise of science-what objectives are pursued by
scientists and what procedures are employed in that
pursuit-does not depend on moral values. What
scientists do is never value-free, although many
scientists adamantly refuse to examine the values

This book is a defense of genetic engineering against
"the Frankenstein thing." In his brief Introduction,
Rollin tells us that "the Frankenstein story strikes a
socially responsive chord, providing us with a way of
articulating our fears and doubts about science and
technology" (3-4). Nothing wrong with that, but "when
and if the myth becomes reified or transformed into or
equated with reality, [it] conceals nuances, shades, and
subtleties of what it represents....The myth is either
accepted as literal truth or categorically rejected as
nonsense, with little thought for the possibilities in
between, where the truth surely lies" (4). In all his work
on animal protection, Rollin has been an aggressive,
articulate, and effective champion of such middle
ground possibilities, so no one familiar with his work
will be surprised to find that this book begins by
energetically toppling abolitionist objections to genetic
engineering then maps out procedures for guiding such
engineering toward beneficial results. If Rollin is correct
that "genetic engineering of animals cannot be
stopped-it is too simple and relatively inexpensive to
accomplish" (4), his middle ground approach is the only
effective expression for our Frankensteinian fears.
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presupposed in what they do, preferring to busy
themselves in the laboratory instead. Unfortunately, they
thus abandon the field to uninformed criticism of what
they are doing.
In the case of genetic engineering, one such criticism
takes the form of contending that we should not play
God, mess with nature, violate the sanctity of life, blur
species distinctions, erode the special place of humans,
and so forth. Rollin acknowledges that those who
oppose genetic engineering on such grounds tend to
present the wrongness of genetic engineering as
self-evident, hence not in need of supporting argument.
However, since these matters are not self-evident to him,
Rollin looks for reasons that might lead one to conclude
that genetic engineering is wrong irrespective of its
consequences. In Jeremy Rifkin's work, he finds that
genetic engineering is tarred with the brush of
reductionism, i.e., viewing life as a bunch of chemicals.
Rollin points out that there is no logical link between
genetic engineering and reductionism. Rollin then
considers the possibility that genetic engineering is
incompatible with the mind-set necessary for producing
the good life for human beings, because it emphasizes
the physical and forgets the personal dimensions of
human life. Again, he answers that there is no logical
connection here; if genetic engineering produces this
result, it is only because we will have failed to give our
scientists adequate humanistic education-something
we are, apparently, already failing to do.
Rollin concludes his critique of Rifkin on the same
note with which he opens his critique of Rolston: the
mystical value given to species cannot be justified. In
the case of Rifkin, Rollin finds that he tries to have it
both ways: he tries to be both a nominalist and a realist,
blurring the difference in order to transfer the common
sense value of separate individuals to separate species.
In the case of Rolston, the confusions are several. First,
he confuses our valuing things in themselves, as we do
when we find them beautiful, with objective value, a
value tllings would have in themselves regardless of
whether anyone appreciated that value. Next Rolston
commits a genetic fallacy by arguing that since humans,
who are intrinsically valuable, are produced by nature,
nature, too, must be intrinsically valuable. Finally,
Rolston relies on a bad argument by analogy, arguing
that since nonsentient nature is analogous to sentient
beings, it has the same, intrinsic value as sentient beings.
Rollin clearly finds attempts, like Rolston's, to give
intrinsic value to nonsentient nature to be worthless,
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and, consequently, he also finds worthless those
criticisms of genetic engineering based on its
interference with supposedly intrinsically valuable
elements of nature, such as species distinctions.
Finally, Rollin points out that mixing human and
animal parts is already standard practice in modern
medicine, with, for example, pig valves being used to
combat human heart disease. His general conclusion is
that claims that genetic engineering is intrinsically
wrong rest on unjustifiable, pseudo-religious categories
and confused, dualistic thinking. The real worries about
genetic engineering are consequential, giving rise to
the second version of the Frankenstein thing: "genetic
engineering of animals, although while [sic Jnot wrong
by its nature, is wrong because it is likely to produce
significant harm" (66). Possible harm to humans is the
subject of the second chapter of Rollin's book.
While Rollin's criticisms of putative "inherent"
values are certainly well-taken, the reader may still
come away from Chapter 1 feeling that there is more to
be said in defense of this first version of "the
Frankenstein thing." At least part of what is meant by
saying that human individuals have "inherent" value is
that they should not be treated as commodities to be
routinely sacrificed if a cost/benefit analysis indicates
that the interests of the group would be enhanced by
such sacrifice. The genetic engineering of animals
embodies the idea that animals lack this sort of inherent
value, for the genetic engineering of animals suggests
that animals are commodities that may be invasively
manipulated and reconstructed in order to make the
exploitation of them for human benefit more efficient
and profitable for human exploiters. Consequently, the
reader may regret that in this discussion, Rollin did not
address some of the mainstream animal liberation
arguments for ascribing this sort of "inherent" value to
animals. (In Chapter 3, Rollin raises the possibility that
genetic engineering might make "us more prone to treat
animals merely as tools for human use rather than as
'ends in themselves,' whose fates matter to them as well
as to us" (193).)
Chapter 2 is actually two chapters. The last seven
sections of the chapter are what one would expect from
the lead-in at the end of Chapter 1: a discussion of the
possible negative, even monstrous consequences of
genetic engineering. These are grouped under
headings of "Evolution in the fast lane," "Narrowing
of the gene pool," "Unwittingly selecting for
pathogens," "Genetically engineered disease models,"
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Second, Rollin's presumption is that the public's
concern with the possibly dangerous consequences of
genetic engineering is, at least in significant part, part
of "the Frankenstein thing," Le., an unrealistic concern
born of ignorance about genetic engineering.
Consequently, a significant part of his concern in writing
this chapter and in proposing democratic review
committees is to "educate" the public out of this sort of
distrust of genetic engineers and engineering. Since
Rollin also emphasizes healthy skepticism about
self-proclaimed "expert" judgments about risk
assessments, readers may wonder if approaching these
public concerns as part of "the Frankenstein thing" is
at all appropriate and does not represent a subtle proresearch bias. Approaching discussion of "ethical and
social issues in the genetic engineering of animals"
under the rubric of "The Frankenstein Syndrome"
similarly bespeaks such a bias.
Third, readers who shade more toward animal
liberation than animal welfare will certainly be much
more skeptical than Rollin about the effectiveness of
his proposed review committees. His proposal is
modeled on the institutional animal care and use
committees mandated by the 1985 amendments to the
Animal Welfare Act. Rollin, who helped write those
amendments, apparently has a high regard for how those
review committees are working; many animal
liberationists have a low regard for the effectiveness of
those committees. Certainly, the animal research
community has been able to dominate those committees,
and especially given the immense financial possibilities
for genetic engineering and that review committees for
this research would have to govern commercial as well
as public research, it is difficult to believe that the
genetic engineering industry would not insure its
domination of these review committees. In response to
Rollin's challenge, "What other option is there?," animal
liberationists would likely propose possibilities that are
much less friendly-less realistic, Rollin would
doubtless say-to the research community.
Chapter 3 focuses on "the plight of the creature,"
i.e., the welfare of animals affected by genetic
engineering. Again, the chapter is divided into two
discussions, the first concerning moral valuing of
animals, the second concerning animal welfare
problems posed by genetic engineering. While this
chapter is again a defense of genetic engineering against
"the Frankenstein thing"-the third aspect of this
"thing" being the mistaken belief that "all genetic

"Environmental," "Military applications," and
"Socioeconomic concerns." These sections are
fundamentally a catalogue of realistic dangers, with
occasional commonsensical suggestions for how to try
to minimize them and, in the case of military
applications, a frank acknowledgment that the public,
at least, is likely to have no opportunity to appraise the
dangers and decide whether and, if so, how, such
research should go forward.
The first ten sections of this chapter are devoted,
first. to a discussion of the difficulties with doing risk
assessment, particularly with new technology, and,
second and consequently, to a recommendation for the
formation of democratic review committees to
evaluate and guide genetic engineering. Rollin is
sensitive to the public distrust of scientific expertise
that has developed over the past two decades and to
the fundamental role of nonscientific values in
reviewing research. He believes that the only way to
counterbalance "the arrogance of experts," who are
professionally disinclined to appropriately weigh the
dangers of research, is to have local, citizen committees
reviewing research proposals on a case-by-case basis.
Having such committees would also both educate the
public about realistic dangers-rather than fictive,
Frankensteinian bogies-and provide the public
reassurance that genetic engineering is not something
that is being forced upon them, whether they approve
or not. This public education and involvement should,
Rollin believes, allay the public distrust of science, thus
providing a win-win situation for both the research
industry and the public.
Animal liberationists will certainly find Rollin's
discussion in this chapter unsatisfying. First, his
presumption is that genetic engineering is going to go
forward, elsewhere even if banned in the United States.
Consequently, his concern is limited to regulating how it
is done. He does not consider whether the possible
dangers of genetic engineering---either in general or
certain kinds of it-are so great that it/they should be
prohibited. This "If we don't do it. somebody else will"
focusing of ethical discussion on secondary, regulative
issues can easily be an excuse for disregarding
fundamental, moral values, and many readers may,
consequently, find Rollin's discussion here shallow, even
disquieting. (Interestingly, in Chapter 3, Rollin considers
banning imports from countries lacking animal-welfare
regulations (191); why couldn't the U.S. similarly flex
its economic muscle to support prohibition?)
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engineering must hanD animals" (169)-that defense
is here much more guarded. Rollin acknowledges that
human prudence and self-interest in genetic engineering
sometimes run contrary to what is best for the well-being
of animals and that the corporate mentality underwriting
the genetic engineering of animals has little interest
either in animal welfare or with social concerns about
animal welfare-<>r with any other social values that
could adversely impact the efficient amassing of wealth.
Rollin begins the chapter with some very perceptive
comments about how social ethics works and about the
changing social ethic concerning animals. Prior to the
last couple of decades, our social ethic concerning
animals focused on cruelty to animals, but we now
recognize that most of the suffering animals endure at
our hands is not due to occasional acts of cruelty; rather,
it is the byproduct of our normal way of handling
animals, particularly in factory farming and biomedical
research. This recognition, in the context ofheightened
sensitivity to all sorts of exploitation of defenseless
groups, is leading us beyond anti-cruelty to a new social
ethic for animals: society "now demands that we protect
the animals' fundamental interests as determined by
their natures" (158, a seven-fold unpacking of this on
157-8). Although we continue to fail to acknowledge
an interest in staying alive to be among those
fundamental interests-something Rollin passes over
in silence-Western society is coming to view
minimizing, if not entirely eliminating, the pain and
suffering of animals at human hands to be a moral duty,
one to be enforced by law and to be fulfilled even when
doing so may be expensive and inconvenient.
Applying this new social ethic to genetic engineering
gives rise to a regulatory principle to be employed by
the review committees discussed in Chapter 2. Rollin
calls this "the principle of conservation of welfare":
"Any animals that are genetically engineered for
human use or even for environmental benefit should
be no worse off, in terms of suffering, after the new
traits are introduced into the genome than the parent
stock was prior to the insertion of the new genetic
material" (179). Rollin discuses in considerable detail
how employing this principle as law could both
minimize the adverse impacts of genetic engineering
on animals and reassure the public that this new
industry was not developing with utter disregard of
social values-again, a win-win solution. The one area
of fundamental difficulty for applying this principle
to such engineering occurs in the development of
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animals carrying the genes that cause human disorders
and then studying those animals, who will be suffering
from those diseases. The only way to accommodate
such studies to the principle of the conservation of
welfare would be, Rollin acknowledges, to find some
way to render the animals nonconscious, so they could
not experience the suffering that is part of the disease.
In an earlier discussion of possible solutions to animal
welfare problems with factory farming, Rollin opined
that society would not accept such nonconscious
monsters. Here, however, since the human-diseased
animals would be so beneficial to us, he believes that
we will want them produced no matter what the cost
in animal welfare; consequently, creating such
monsters is the only way to prevent this sort of genetic
engineering from causing massive animal sufferingthere are 3000 human genetic disorders available for
injecting into animals, and at least as many genetic
engineers salivating to do so.
As always, Rollin insists on keeping ethical
discussion practical. His starting point is that the genetic
engineering of animals is going to continue and expand,
and his concern is, then, how we can insure that the
growing social commitment to minimizing animal
suffering is not trampled under in the rush to the cheap
food, medical miracles, and great profits promised by
this new technology. Although he is optimistic that our
new social ethic concerning animal welfare is strong
enough to sustain significant regulation of genetic
engineering for the animals' benefit, he is aware that
much in our treaunent of animals shows us up as
"mean-spirited, self-serving, exploitative beings" (193).
The book concludes with brief discussions of
animal patenting and the mechanics of genetic
engineering. Rollin dismisses the patenting issue as
an example of his Gresham's law for ethics: bad moral
issues drive out good issues. In this case, a secondary
issue has captured much media attention, even though
the groundwork for deciding it has not been laidand the attention focused on this secondary issue has
diverted energy away from laying that groundwork.
The groundwork is, of course, the nest of issues
discussed in this book. Until we decide the social!
ethical issues Rollin raises, we cannot reasonably
determine whether we should continue to regard
animals as property and, even if we do so, what sorts
of regulation we want to place on the use and treatment
of such property. (Personally, Rollin believes that
"animals should not legally be property, and the
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arguments that applied to humans not being owned
apply, mutatis mutandis, to animals" (209).)
Bernie Rollin has devoted his life to ameliorating
the condition of animals sacrificed in the agriculture
and biomedical industries. He has thoughtfully analyzed
where Western society is heading concerning animal
welfare, and he has tirelessly pushed those in power to
take the furthest step society is ready for toward
respecting animal life and protecting animal interests.
A great many animals have endured much less suffering
thanks to Rollin's fine work. The Frankenstein
Syndrome constitutes another important contribution
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to that work-and to the literature on genetic
engineering in partiCUllar and practical ethics in general.
While animal liberationists will find the book
unsatisfying, because they do not accept Rollin's
starting point-that the genetic engineering of animals
is inevitable---avid genetic engineers, eager to do with
their animals whatever they please, will find that Rollin
is pushing for significant constraints on their work,
protecting both humans and animals. They will also
find that they are hard pressed to challenge the
common sense and logic of his prudential social and
animal welfare arguments.
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